summit when they would have only a slight drop between them and the eastern top. The only maps they possessed were aeronautical charts of a scale of sixteen miles to the inch. In fact, when the aircraft were searching, they had been reporting more mountains than existed on the maps they were using.

It was decided that four men, all specialists, should go for the summit, travelling light and fast in case there were survivors in the wreck. The likelihood of this was very remote but had to be considered. This climbing party would be backed up by nine others carrying food, spare clothing and radio. The men chosen for the advance party were Jack Emmerson for his mountaineering experience, Whelan, bottomer and Costall for their specialised knowledge of aircraft, instruments and radio. All were competent mountaineers.

They turned in early and were away at first light on the following morning (May 1st). They used the transport as far as it was practicable, which saved them about two miles of walking and five hundred feet of height. Then the gradient steepened and the work began.

Emmerson had chosen the S.S.W. ridge as being the most feasible for this large and heavily-laden party. Although the main body of the team were acting as porters, the four climbers were still carrying about forty pounds apiece of personal equipment and pyrotechnics. Despite this they made excellent progress until they reached the snow-line. The snow, at first hard, deteriorated rapidly to the worst conditions possible: a thin hard surface crust which broke at every step. It was like wading upwards through saturated cotton wool.

A Turkish helicopter came up from base, hovered, and dropped aerial photographs of the wreck. These were of no use to them; they would have preferred some pictures of the mountain.

Above 9,000 feet they were in intermittent cloud and the snow became deeper. On their right the slope steepened, falling away into a great corrie; the cloud thickened, the wind increased, and it began to snow heavily.

By midday the fatigue of the `porters' (who, nevertheless, would have gone on had they been asked), combined with worsening weather, influenced their decision to pitch Camp I at 11,000 feet. The porters helped to clear a platform for two pup tents and these were pitched slightly below the crest where there was a little shelter. But they were still very exposed.

When the tents were up, the porters returned to base, leaving the other four in Camp I. The climbers cooked a meal on their Primus stoves and contacted base camp by radio. This was the only time they used wireless; afterwards the batteries froze. Before dark the cloud lifted momentarily and they could see the base camp.

The night was very long and very cold, and those who didn't possess them wished devoutly for duvet jackets. It snowed heavily during the hours of darkness.

The following morning dawned bright and clear with a stiff breeze. There was some delay in getting away for both tents and all the gear which had been left outside had to be dug out of the snow. Emmerson split the party into two, with him-self and Costall climbing, and the other two in support and carrying the bulk of the gear. One tent was struck and the other left standing for the return of Bottomer and Whelan. They divided the food and left half of it at Camp I.

They continued up the ridge, kicking steps in deep snow. It was a brilliant morning, with their own mountain clear and - to the north-east - other great mountains were shining with new snow: Ararat perhaps and all the mountains of Armenia beyond.

It had been arranged previously that a Hastings should make a drop in the vicinity of the wreck on this day, and when they were about 200 feet below the summit, they saw it coming in from the south-west to make its run. Cloud was building up again - which explained why the drop was being made without the pre-arranged signal from the climbers. Continue to page 4